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Paradoxes and pitfalls in using fuzzy set QCA: illustrations from a 
critical review of a study of educational inequality 
Abstract 
Charles Ragin’s crisp set and fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA and 
fsQCA) are being used by increasing numbers of social scientists interested in 
combining analytic rigour with case-based approaches. As with all techniques that 
become available in easy-to-use software packages, there is a danger that QCA will 
come to be used in a routinised manner, with not enough attention being paid to its 
particular strengths and weaknesses. Users of fsQCA in particular need to be very aware 
of particular problems that can arise when fuzzy logic lies behind their analyses. This 
paper aims to increase its readers’ understanding of some of these problems and of 
some means by which they might be alleviated. We use a critical discussion of a recent 
paper by Freitag and Schlicht addressing social inequality in education in Germany as 
our vehicle. After summarising the substantive claims of th paper, we explain some key 
features of QCA. We subsequently discuss two main issues, (i) limited diversity and the 
various ways of using counterfactual reasoning to address it, and (ii) the logical 
paradoxes that can arise when using fsQCA. Making different choices than Freitag and 
Schlicht do in respect of dealing with these two issues, we undertake some reanalysis of 
their data, showing that their conclusions must be treated with some caution. We end by 
drawing some general lessons for users of QCA. 
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Qualitative Comparative Analysis, fsQCA, Educational inequality, German educational 
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Introduction 
We undertake a partial critical review of a recent paper (Freitag & Schlicht 2009) 
addressing a sociologically and politically important topic. Our main purpose, however, 
is not to provide a critique of this paper per se, but to use a critical discussion of it as a 
platform for exploring some important outstanding problems in fuzzy set 
configurational analysis (Ragin 2000, 2008) and how these might be addressed. We 
have several reasons for choosing this paper, which analyses the conditions and/or 
causes of differences in the degree of social inequality of educational access between 
German Länder, as our vehicle. First, the paper addresses a very important topic, 
making plausible and interesting claims about causes and policy options in an area 
where decisions impact on individuals’ educational and occupational careers. Second, 
we believe that the authors, in reaching their conclusions, may have not considered as 
fully as they might have the complexities and paradoxes of fuzzy logical analysis. In 
addition, given that the techniques employed are not very well-known, readers need to 
be informed to a greater degree than they are in the authors’ paper about some of the 
method-specific problems that need to be taken into account in judging the validity of 
the conclusions reached. Finally, Freitag and Schlicht have, very properly, made their 
procedure transparent, making it easy to reconstruct their methods and to reanalyse their 
data. 
 
Freitag and Schlicht’s paper 
Freitag and Schlicht’s paper (2009) is a welcome addition to the literature on the meso-
level causes of educational inequality. While systemic analysis of social inequality in 
educational outcomes is not new in itself, their use of Ragin’s configurational analytic 
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methods is innovative and welcome, given that the causes of differences between 
German Länder - their focus - are not likely to be simply linear in nature.  Furthermore, 
while Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) has been employed in 
typological studies of welfare states (e.g. Kvist 2007), it has been used little, thus far, 
for similar purposes in the political sociology of education1. Ragin’s set theoretic 
approach aims to provide an analysis of the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for 
some outcome. Freitag and Schlicht take this approach in analysing their German data, 
and make several strong causal claims and some policy recommendations.  
 
German secondary schooling is still mainly selective. Though comprehensive schools 
do exist in many Länder, in most there are still three main types of secondary school 
running from the most academic Gymnasium, via the Realschule, to the least academic 
Hauptschule, these existing alongside any comprehensive Gesamtschulen. Selection 
takes place at the end of primary schooling, though its timing, and the degree to which it 
can be modified, do vary across Länder. As possible causes of regional differences in 
inequality, Freitag and Schlicht focus on institutional differences between Länder in 
respect of the forms of secondary schooling, as well as differences in selection practices 
and the availability of pre-school education.  
 
We will briefly summarise their complex paper. They develop their analyses and reach 
their conclusions as follows. Using a variety of data sources, they construct four “causal 
conditions” that vary across Länder2. All of these are expected, on theoretical grounds, 
to raise the likelihood of there being a high degree of social inequality in educational 
outcomes (measured by an odds ratio comparing access to the academically selective 
Gymnasium for children from different social backgrounds3). Their chosen four causal 
conditions characterising Länder, preceded here by their short names, are: 
 
 CHILD: Underdeveloped Early Childhood Education 
 FULL: Underdeveloped All-Day School 
 SELECT: Strong Selectivity in Secondary School Education  
 TRACK: Early Tracking into Different School Types 
 
These conditions are considered configurationally, i.e. instead of undertaking some 
form of regression analysis to determine the net effect of each factor, with others 
controlled, the authors employ set theoretic methods which focus on the ways in which 
conjunctions of these factors are, logically and/or causally, necessary and/or sufficient 
for there being high or low social inequality in educational outcomes.  One key 
conclusion is that well-developed early childhood education is necessary for a low 
degree of educational inequality. They also make a number of claims about the 
conjunctions of conditions that are sufficient for both a high and a low degree of such 
inequality. These sufficiency claims are shown in Table 1, where upper case letters 
indicate the presence of a factor, lower case letters its absence, the * indicates that 
factors must be conjoined, and the + refers to logical OR, i.e. it indicates alternative 
paths to the outcome. It can be seen, for example, that CHILD, or “underdeveloped 
early childhood education”, has been found to be a sufficient condition for high 
inequality. The single sufficient condition for low inequality is the conjunction of 
developed early childhood education and a low degree of early tracking.  
 
Table 1: Freitag’s and Schlicht’s main results 
Outcome Sufficient paths 
A high degree of social inequality in education 




A low degree of social inequality in education child*track  
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We readily agree with the authors that QCA is a suitable tool with which to undertake a 
comparative analysis of the possible effects of structural and policy differences between 
the German Länder on the degree of social inequality of educational outcomes. 
However, the method is still under development, particularly in its fuzzy set theoretic 
form, and its use needs therefore to be accompanied by a high degree of methodological 
awareness if certain problematic aspects of fuzzy logical reasoning are to be avoided. 
We have struggled with some of these problems and paradoxes in our own work 
(Cooper & Glaesser 2008b). We will argue here that Freitag and Schlicht, in their 
analysis, have not taken full account of some of the problems that can arise in using 
fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) and, as a result, their conclusions 
need to be treated with some caution. In order to develop our argument we will need to 
discuss, in some detail, several features of fsQCA. In particular, without some 
understanding of the ways in which the “truth table algorithm” operates in fsQCA, of 
why some logically paradoxical results can arise, and the way “logical remainders” are 
dealt with by Freitag and Schlicht, readers will not be able to see exactly why and where 
possible problems in their analysis originate.   
 
We will not, here, take the authors’ decisions prior to their Boolean analysis of 
necessity and sufficiency as a matter for critical discussion. While others may want to 
question the particular choice they make of an outcome measure to represent inequality 
and of their putative causal conditions, and also their set theoretic calibration of these 
factors, we will not address these issues. Clearly, as with all analyses employing QCA, 
their results partly depend on these decisions (Ragin 2008). Our concern, though, is 
rather with some particular aspects of their analysis of their constructed and calibrated 
dataset. We believe these aspects need to be better understood by those employing 
fsQCA in the way the authors do, and by their readers.  
 
The paper has the following structure. After introducing some key elements of QCA 
and fsQCA, in order to provide the necessary foundations for our later discussion, we 
use Freitag and Schlicht’s core “truth table” to illustrate how such a table is constructed 
from fuzzy set data, concentrating not only on what such a truth table shows but also 
what it tends to hide from the less experienced reader. We then discuss, in turn, two 
central problem areas in the analysis of such truth tables, limited diversity and a key 
logical paradox that arises when fuzzy logic is employed, critically discussing the ways 
in which these have been handled by the authors. We then take account of our critical 
discussion in presenting some illustrative reanalyses of the truth table, showing why the 
conclusions drawn by the authors need to be treated with some caution.  
 
QCA: Exploring sufficiency with crisp and fuzzy sets  
In order to develop our eventual argument, we need to present and discuss the way in 
which fsQCA, via its “truth table algorithm”, produces its solutions, particularly for 
sufficiency. Taking the simple case of crisp sets first, where a case is simply either in or 
out of any set, then, for a condition, or a conjunction of conditions, X, to be strictly 
sufficient for an outcome Y, we need the set of cases with the condition, or conjunction 
of conditions, X, to be a subset of the set of cases with outcome, as in the Venn diagram 
in Figure 1. Here, if X, then Y. More realistically, we will usually aim to test for quasi-
sufficiency, as in Figure 2, where most, but not all, cases with the condition also have 
the outcome. Here, the proportion of the cases with X that also have Y can be used as a 
simple measure of the consistency of the subsethood relation with one of perfect 
sufficiency (Ragin 2006b).  
 
It can also be seen in these figures that not all cases of Y are “explained”, or covered, by 
X. To capture this Ragin employs a measure termed “coverage” (analogous to variance 
explained in conventional approaches) which reports the proportion of the outcome set 
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Y covered, or overlapped by, X. In these simple cases, this measure is equivalent to a 
measure of consistency with the necessity of X for Y. For X to be necessary for Y, Y 
must be a subset of X. 
 
Crisp set QCA (developed by Ragin 1987) was criticised by some for employing 
dichotomous factors, though it is possible to use dummy variables as a way of avoiding 
some of the restrictions this imposes. However, since the publication of his 1987 book 
Ragin (2000, 2008) has worked to develop a fuzzy set based version of QCA, fsQCA, 
which allows configurational analysis to use continuous measures. Matters such as 
sufficiency become considerably more complicated when fuzzy sets are employed, 
where cases can have membership in the sets X and Y ranging from full non-
membership of 0 through such values as 0.5 (as much in as out of a set) to full 
membership of 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: X strictly sufficient for Y 
 
 
Figure 2: X quasi-sufficient for Y 
 
 
The operations of conventional set theory (intersection, union, negation, subsethood, 
etc.) all have equivalents in fuzzy set theory (Goertz 2006, Ragin 2000, Smithson & 
Verkuilen 2006). To negate a fuzzy membership score, for example, one simply 
subtracts it from one. The simplest way of assessing fuzzy subsethood uses an 
arithmetic approach. If the membership of a case in set X is arithmetically less than or 
equal to its membership in set Y, then this case passes the test for fuzzy subsethood 
(also called fuzzy inclusion). On a plot of membership in Y against membership in X, 
such cases are on or above the Y=X line, i.e. they comprise an upper triangular plot 
(Ragin 2008, p. 48). The proportion of cases with non-zero membership in the condition 
set X passing such a test can be used as a simple test of consistency with a relationship 
of sufficiency for some outcome set Y, i.e. of the degree to which perfect sufficiency is 
approximated4. This simple approach is not, however, the one implemented in fsQCA’s 
“truth table algorithm”.  We will briefly explain the principles behind the alternative 
that is actually implemented in the software (Ragin et al. 2008). 
 
Looking at Figure 2, it can be seen that, for crisp sets, the proportional measure of 
consistency with sufficiency actually is equivalent to comparing the size of two sets, 
one the intersection of the sets of cases with X and Y (the darker grey subset), the other 
the set of cases with the “causal” condition X (the black and darker grey subsets taken 
together). In set theoretic terms, this measure of the consistency with sufficiency5, for 
crisp sets, is: 
 
     
   
            (1) 
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where   indicates set intersection and the double bars the cardinality or size of the sets 
in the numerator and denominator.  
 
The procedure implemented in fsQCA’s “truth table algorithm” uses a fuzzy set 
analogue of this expression. In the crisp set context, we get our measure of the size of a 
set by simply counting the number of members in it. Clearly simple whole number 
counting won’t work for a fuzzy set, where cases can have partial membership. 
However, an “obvious” intuitive measure of the size of a fuzzy set is given by summing 
the partial membership for all cases in a set. Formally, if mx represents the degree of 
membership of each case i in the set x, a measure of the size of x is given, if we sum 
over all the members i of the set, by: 
 
 
             (2) 
 
This provides us with a “fuzzy” way of calculating the denominator of expression (1). 
To calculate the numerator, we need, in addition, a fuzzy analogue of crisp set 
intersection. The operation employed in fsQCA for the intersection of two (or more) 
fuzzy sets involves taking the minimum of the cases’ membership in each set. Taking 
this approach (see Ragin 2006b), we have, for evaluating the fuzzy set sufficiency of x 
for y, the following expression for the consistency of the relation with one of 
sufficiency, where the intersection in the numerator is operationalised as the minimum 











         (3) 
Constructing a truth table with fuzzy sets 
We now need to consider how these definitions and procedures allow the construction 
of a “truth table” from fuzzy set data. In doing so, we move from considering a 
condition X to considering conditions comprised of combinations of factors. The truth 
table plays a crucial role in QCA by summarising the relations between sets 
representing configurations of conditions and the presence or absence of the outcome 
under study. What is involved in moving from a fuzzily calibrated dataset to a truth 
table ready for analysis can be illustrated by looking at two tables from Freitag and 
Schlicht’s paper. Table 2 shows the fuzzy scores they allocated for each German Land 
to the outcome and the four conditions. Table 3 is their resulting truth table. With four 







Table 2: the fuzzy membership scores for the properties of Länder (from Table 3 of 
Freitag & Schlicht’s paper) 
Cases (Länder) Outcome: high 















Schleswig Holstein (SH) 0.28 0.20 0.92 0.73 0.80 
Hamburg (HH) 0.65 0.00 0.79 0.05 0.80 
Lower Saxony (NI) 0.09 0.22 0.70 0.86 0.00 
Bremen (HB) 0.23 0.24 0.79 0.46 0.00 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) 0.83 0.65 0.15 0.30 0.80 
Hesse (HE) 0.13 0.43 0.20 0.29 0.40 
Rhineland Palatinate (RP) 0.87 0.83 0.75 0.75 0.40 
Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW) 0.84 0.71 0.75 1.00 1.00 
Bavaria (BY) 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Saarland (SL) 0.63 0.83 0.87 0.16 0.80 
Berlin (BE) 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 
Brandenburg (BB)  0.00 0.04 0.34 0.00 0.00 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (MV) 0.62 0.14 0.36 0.40 0.80 
Saxony (SN) 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.80 
Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 1.00 0.12 0.41 0.28 0.80 
Thuringia (TH) 0.55 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 3: Freitag and Schlicht’s truth table 



































0 0 0 1 MV, SN, ST, TH 0.7 0.64 
0 0 0 0 HE, BE, BB 0.5 0.93 
1 1 1 1 BW, BY 0.98 0.38 
0 1 0 0 HB 0.69 0.9 
0 1 0 1 HH 0.92 0.65 
0 1 1 0 NI 0.63 0.9 
0 1 1 1 SH 0.79 0.78 
1 0 0 1 NW 0.86 0.63 
1 1 0 1 SL 0.87 0.64 
1 1 1 0 RP 0.9 0.71 
0 0 1 0 – 0.79 0.86 
0 0 1 1 – 0.92 0.71 
1 0 0 0 – 0.79 0.85 
1 0 1 0 – 0.82 0.84 
1 0 1 1 – 0.9 0.71 
1  1 0 0 – 0.9 0.86 
 
Note (to the original table): The columns in grey boxes indicate the results are judged as consistently 
sufficient for the outcome. The columns in white boxes indicate logical remainders are included in the 
reduction for the most parsimonious solution (Freitag and Schlicht, p. 60). 
 
We can use use the case of Hamburg (HH) to explain exactly how a case is allocated to 
just one row of the truth table (Table 3). Hamburg has these values for the conditions: 
 
Underdeveloped early childhood education (CHILD):  0.00 
Underdeveloped all-day school (FULL):    0.79 
Strong tripartition (SELECT):     0.05 
Early tracking (TRACK):      0.80 
 
Consider the first row of Table 3, marked as the configuration 0001. This can be spelt 
out more fully, using the upper and lower case notation, as child*full*select*TRACK. 
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What degree of membership does Hamburg have in this configuration? To calculate this 
we must first negate three conditions (the 0s) and then take the minimum (for set 
intersection) of these memberships values and the score for TRACK. Doing this 
requires us to calculate the MINIMUM [ (1-0), (1-0.79), (1-0.05), (0.80) ] which 
reduces to MINIMUM [ (1), (0.21), (0.95), (0.80) ], giving a membership for Hamburg 
of 0.21 in child*full*select*TRACK. These rules for negation and intersection generate 
the memberships for Hamburg in the 16 configurations shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Hamburg’s membership in the 16 configurations 


















Inspection of these shows that Hamburg has non-zero membership in half of the 16 
logically possible configurations, but passes the value of 0.5 indicating that it is more in 
than out of the configuration in just one case, that of 0101 or 
child*FULL*select*TRACK7. As can be seen from Table 3, Hamburg (HH) is allocated to 
this row in which it has its greatest membership. The remaining Länder are allocated in the 
same way. It can be seen that six configurations have no cases with memberships of over 
0.5 though, as will become important for our arguments later, they do have cases with 
smaller memberships. We will call cases with membership of greater than 0.5 “good” cases 
for the configuration in which they have this membership. Six configurations have no such 
“good” cases. It is clearly important, given this complexity, to understand both what a truth 
table derived from fuzzy sets shows and what it hides. As we explained earlier, in 
discussing Hamburg, the use of 0s and 1s should not be taken here, as they should be in 
truth tables derived from crisp sets, to indicate that the four Länder shown against 0001 
actually have scores of 0 or 1 in the four conditions. The configuration 0001 rather 
represents an ideal type (Kvist 2007), or the corners of the cell in a 4-dimensional vector 
space in which these four Länder have their greatest membership.   
 
Before returning to the discussion of consistency, we’ll just note some important 
features of this particular truth table.  First, in Table 5 we show the actual membership 
values that each Land has in the configuration against which it appears in the truth table. 
This shows for example that, if we look at the two Länder that appear in the row 1111 
(CHILD*FULL*SELECT*TRACK), BW and BY, their scores are 0.71 and 0.92. They 
are both “good” cases (> 0.5) but we can see that they are not equally “good” and also 
that the score of 0.71 for BW would only be associated with the verbal description 
“more or less in the set” by Ragin himself (2000). If we examine all the Länder, looking 
at their membership in their allocated configuration (Table 5), we can see that some are 
not such good exemplars of their configurationally defined type of case as these two. 
Three cases, ST, HE and HB, have largest memberships of 0.59, 0.57 and 0.54 
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respectively, values very close to the 0.5 point representing being as much in as out of 
the set. These are not very “good” cases of their type. 
 
Table 5: Highest membership of Länder in any configuration 
Cases highest membership in any configuration Ragin’s description (Table 6.4 of FSSS) 
TH 0.94 Mostly in the set 
BY 0.92 Mostly in the set 
BE 0.84 Mostly in the set 
SL 0.80 Mostly in the set 
SN 0.80 Mostly in the set 
HH 0.79 Mostly in the set 
SH 0.73 More or less in the set 
BW 0.71 More or less in the set 
NI 0.70 More or less in the set 
BB 0.66 More or less in the set 
NW 0.65 More or less in the set 
RP 0.6 More or less in the set 
MV 0.6 More or less in the set 
ST 0.59 More or less in the set 
HE 0.57 More or less in the set 
HB 0.54 More or less in the set 
 
Another important point concerns the rows that have no “good” cases. As we explained 
earlier, some Länder will have partial memberships, lower than 0.5, in these 
configurations. As an example, consider the row 1100, i.e. CHILD*FULL*select*track. 
Table 6 shows the membership of all the Länder in this configuration. Ten cases have 
non-zero membership, but all are lower than 0.5, as expected, and the highest, RP, has 
just 0.25. Some implications of this will be discussed later. 
 
Table 6: Membership values of the Länder in the configuration 1100 
Cases RP HB HE SH SL NW NI MV ST BB HH BW BY BE SN TH 
1100 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Consistency again 
We return now to consistency. We can see the results of expression (3) for calculating 
consistency having been used in practice by looking at Table 3. Taking the first row, 
0001, as an example, we have here the configuration or type, using the lower and upper 
case notation employed by Freitag and Schlicht, child*full*select*TRACK. The “good” 
cases, i.e. Länder, falling under this type are shown (see Table 2 for their full names) 
and, crucially, in the final two columns, the consistency with a relationship of 
sufficiency for this configuration is shown for both the outcome and its negation. Using 
expression (3), and letting x be, in turn, each configuration represented by the rows of 
the table, while y is taken, first, to be the outcome of a high degree and then, second, the 
outcome of a low degree of social inequality in education, Freitag and Schlicht obtain 
the complete set of consistencies with a relation of sufficiency shown in the final two 
columns. These two figures are, then, an assessment of the degree to which each 
configuration, treated as a fuzzy set, is, respectively, a subset of the fuzzy set for the 
outcome or the negated outcome.  
 
It should be stressed, however, that these consistencies are calculated using not just the 
“good” cases that appear against each row but by using all the non-zero memberships 
that Länder have in any row (hence the appearance of consistencies for rows that have 
no “good” cases8). Contrary to this, many might have expected consistencies to be 
calculated using only “good” cases (resulting in rows with no “good” cases having no 
consistency figures). Ragin himself (2008, 129-130) has chosen to use all cases with 
non-zero membership to calculate consistency, this following from a concern with the 
overall relationship of fuzzy subsethood between any configuration of conditions and 
the outcome, while he uses the number of cases in a configuration with membership of 
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over 0.5 to give a separate indication of whether there are “good” cases exemplifying 
this relationship. We will return to some paradoxical results this choice produces, given 
the distribution of membership values in the authors’ calibrated dataset, later9. 
 
Having provided the necessary background, we now discuss the two key interrelated 
problems that arise in the analysis of Freitag and Schlicht’s truth table. These problems 
concern (i) how to address the “limited diversity” that characterises this (and many 
other) truth tables and (ii) a logical paradox that arises when consistencies are calculated 
using fuzzy membership data for all cases with non-zero membership, i.e. not just 
“good” cases. After discussing these two issues we will undertake some reanalysis of 
the truth table to show how different ways of responding to these problems than Freitag 
and Schlicht’s preferred approach leads to different conclusions than theirs. 
 
Limited Diversity 
Ragin has stressed that data taken from the social world are often characterised by 
limited diversity. By this he refers to the fact that, especially given small to medium size 
samples or populations, some configurations of factors are likely to be represented by 
few or even no cases. In his more recent writings (e.g. 2008), he has recommended 
various forms of counterfactual reasoning as a fruitful way of addressing the problems 
such limited diversity produces for the analyst wishing to produce configurational 
accounts of the sufficient and/or necessary conditions for some outcome. Table 3 here 
shows such limited diversity. Considering just “good” cases, the sixteen Länder do not, 
as the authors themselves note, cover, the sixteen possible configurations or types. As 
we explained above, while there are four “good” cases of Länder available to represent 
the type appearing in the first row, 0001, there are none at all to represent any of the six 
appearing in the bottom rows of the table. Such rows, lacking any “good” cases at all, 
are termed “logical remainders” in the QCA literature (Ragin 2008, 131-133). 
 
This high degree of limited diversity has the consequence, in the context of the 
empirical distribution of the cases that do exist across the various conjunctions of 
conditions and the outcome, that any set theoretic accounts of the combinations of the 
conditions sufficient for the outcomes of high or low inequality will tend to be complex 
rather than parsimonious in form (Ragin 2008), as will be seen later. The authors do 
include such complex solutions in their footnotes, but choose to avoid focusing on them 
in the body of their text, discussing instead, and drawing their conclusions from, some 
more parsimonious solutions that have been produced by making various counterfactual 
assumptions about what the outcomes would have been, had suitable cases actually 
existed, for the “remainder” configurations lacking “good” empirical cases. We will 
raise some concerns about the way these decisions have been made. 
 
To follow our argument here one needs to understand what happens to the rows of a 
truth table during the process of minimisation that the fsQCA software uses to produce 
its solutions. We can take the “complex” rather than “parsimonious” analysis of the 
sufficient conditions for a high degree of inequality as an example, using just rows that 
have at least one “good” case. Here “logical remainder” rows, whatever their 
consistency figures, are not allowed into the minimised solution of the truth table. The 
penultimate column of Table 3 provides the relevant consistency figures. None of these 
reach the figure of 1.0 that would indicate a configuration is strictly sufficient for the 
outcome, but several do reach quite high values, such as 0.9 or 0.98. The analyst must 
set a threshold figure for the lowest consistency value which will be taken to indicate 
the quasi-sufficiency of a configuration for the outcome. It is conventional to take 
account of any large gaps in the distribution of consistency values across configurations 
in making this decision. The authors choose, for their analysis, a value of 0.85. Of the 
ten rows with “good” cases, five pass this test. They are, using the 0/1 notation: 1111, 
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0101, 1110, 1101 and 1001. These include six of the sixteen “good” cases in Table 310. 
This solution for quasi-sufficiency could be written, using the 0/1 notation, as: 
 
1111 + 0101 + 1110 +1101 + 1001. 
 
In fsQCA practice, however, the next step is the minimisation of this complexity, with 
the goal of producing, if possible, a simplified expression. The minimisation process is 
simple in principle if not in practice. Take, for example, the two configurations 1111 
and 1101, both of which have passed the test set for quasi-sufficiency. It can be seen 
that the third factor, strong selectivity, makes no relevant difference, given the chosen 
level of consistency. These two terms can be collapsed to 11-1 where the dash indicates 
that the third factor makes no difference. Using repeated applications of such a 
procedure fsQCA produces minimised overall solutions of such dichotomised truth 
tables as Table 3. The resulting minimised “complex” solution is: 
 
CHILD*select*TRACK + FULL*select*TRACK + CHILD*FULL*SELECT.    
 
Readers new to QCA might have expected only the five rows meeting the chosen 
consistency threshold of 0.85 and having at least one “good” case to go forward into a 
minimised solution. On this view, rows with no “good” cases should not enter the 
minimisation process, with the solution remaining the “complex” one just given. Ragin 
(2008) has argued, however, that there are situations where our theoretical knowledge, 
independently of the consistency scores for “logical remainders”, can justify making 
counterfactual assumptions as to whether some other configurations, from amongst 
those lacking “good” or even any cases, would be quasi-sufficient for the outcome to 
occur. Allowing such additional counterfactual configurations into the minimisation 
process can provide simpler and more general overall solutions. Crucially, in addition to 
this theoretically driven approach, an alternative possibility is just to allow the software, 
in a less theoretically informed way, to allocate the outcome or its absence to these 
logical remainder rows in whatever way produces the most parsimonious minimised 
solution. Here remainder rows are treated as “don’t cares’ in fsQCA. Freitag and 
Schlicht opt for this atheoretical, and rather mechanical, parsimonious approach, 
providing some justificatory argument after the event.  
 
Table 7 gives the full details11 of the complex solution12 (4) for a high degree of social 
inequality, i.e. the solution that allows only the five rows having “good” cases and 
passing the threshold to go forward, setting it against the parsimonious solution (5) 
preferred by the authors, this being: 
 
CHILD + FULL*select*TRACK.    
 
In both cases, these expressions show the combinations of the presence or absence of 
four causal conditions that are quasi-sufficient, at the chosen 0.85 consistency level, for 
this outcome. The key point concerning solution (5) is that, in addition to the five 
configurations that actually have “good” empirical cases in the dataset, it contains four 
other configurations that have no such “good” cases.  These are the four configurations 
sitting at the bottom of Table 3, one of which we discussed in an earlier section. In 
producing this parsimonious solution, the authors have added nearly as many logical 
remainders to the solution (four) as they have configurations with actual “good” cases 
(five). The added rows are those boxed in Table 3, being 1000, 1010, 1011 and 1100. 
These are now all included in the minimised solution as subsets of CHILD.  
 
11 
Table 7: Complex and parsimonious solutions for the outcome, high degree of social 
inequality in education 
--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---  
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.860825  
   
                           raw       unique                
                         coverage    coverage   consistency   
                        ----------  ----------  ----------    
CHILD*select*TRACK      0.285536    0.083541    0.838828  
FULL*select*TRACK       0.355362    0.153367    0.882353  
CHILD*FULL*SELECT       0.448878    0.305486    0.944882 
  
solution coverage: 0.744389  
solution consistency: 0.892377 
(4) 
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---  
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.860825  
   
                          raw       unique                
                        coverage    coverage   consistency   
                       ----------  ----------  ----------    
CHILD                  0.600998    0.399002    0.876364  
FULL*select*TRACK      0.355362    0.153367    0.882353 
  
solution coverage: 0.754364  
solution consistency: 0.880641 
(5) 
 
What then precisely underlies the conclusion that underdeveloped early childhood 
education is sufficient for a high degree of social inequality? We can explore this, 
illustratively, by examining a configuration that is claimed under expression (5) to be 
sufficient, but is a logical remainder, i.e. one that has no “good” cases. Consider the 
configuration, 1010, for which there are no “good” cases. This does happen to have a 
consistency of 0.82, approaching the threshold of 0.85. This is not, however, the reason 
it has been included in the solution (as a subset of CHILD, i.e. of 1- - -). It has been 
included simply because allocating to it, counterfactually, the outcome rather than its 
absence produces a more parsimonious solution.  It might be argued, however, that the 
near to 0.85 consistency figure could be used to lend support to this particular decision. 
The plot of the fuzzy membership scores for the outcome, a high degree of social 
inequality in education, and for this configuration, CHILD*full*SELECT*track, are 
shown in Figure 3. 
Of the sixteen cases, seven have no membership at all in this conjunction of conditions. 
Of the nine remaining cases, seven fall into the upper triangular area of the plot, thereby 
formally satisfying the simple x=<y condition for sufficiency. However, amongst these 
nine cases, the highest membership in 1010 is 0.29. This set of partial memberships 
seems a very weak basis for allowing the configuration 1010 to be taken forward into 
the minimisation procedure, whether this decision is based on increasing parsimony 
(since there are actually no good cases of German Länder of this type) or on the near to 
0.85 consistency figure. A similar point applies to the other three remainders that have 
been allowed to go forward. The highest memberships of any Länder in them are, in 
turn, 0.25 for 1100, 0.3 for 1011 and a larger 0.43 for 1000 (though the next largest 
value is only 0.25). 
In relation to possibly taking account of the consistency figures for remainder rows, 
Ragin, notwithstanding his decision to calculate consistencies in the “truth table 
algorithm” on the basis of all cases having non-zero membership, however small, in the 
condition set, has raised some relevant concerns about relying on such cases: 
Imagine trying to support an argument in an oral presentation to colleagues us ing in-depth 
evidence on a case with only weak membership in the relevant sets. The common sense thinking 
that indicates that this presentation would be a waste of time is precisely formalized in fuzzy 
membership scores. Cases with strong membership in the causal condition provide the most 





We have come to believe this argument has much to recommend it and have taken it 
into account in determining the nature of the illustrative reanalyses we will present later 
in the paper. However, for anyone contemplating using the consistencies associated 
with remainder rows in place of purely mechanical considerations of parsimony to 
determine which remainders are allocated the outcome, there is a further specific 
problem arising from reliance on cases with small memberships in calculating 
consistencies – that of logical paradoxes. We consider this next. 
 
Paradoxical results with fuzzy sets 
Here we discuss certain paradoxical results that can result from the use of fuzzy sets and 
logic, of which any analyst needs to be aware. It is, of course, a feature of fuzzy sets that 
a case can have membership in both a set and its negation, with the latter being 
calculated by subtracting the membership score in the first set from 1. If a case has 
membership in X of 0.3 and membership Y of, say, 0.6, then we can see that X will be 
found to be sufficient for Y, since X is less than or equal to Y. However, X is also 
sufficient for NOT-Y, since X is less than or equal to 0.414. Given, then, the use of fuzzy 
sets and logic, a situation can arise where the same configuration can be quasi-sufficient 




Figure 3: outcome by 1010 (consistency is 0.82) 
Depending on exactly where the threshold is set, we can find examples of this in Table 
3. For example, the consistency values for the outcome, high degree of social inequality 
of education and its negation, for the configuration 1100, are 0.9 and 0.86. The authors 
have chosen to use a mechanical parsimony-seeking approach to allocate the outcome or 
its absence to the remainder rows, i.e. they do not pay attention to the consistency 
figures that appear next to these rows. We can see, however, that the consistency 
figures, in some cases, are not in line with the results of the mechanical approach. For 
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example, in the case of the configuration 1010, which they have, as we saw above, 
allowed to go forward as part of the solution for high inequality, the consistency figure, 
based entirely on “not good” cases, is actually slightly larger for the negated outcome, 
i.e. low inequality (0.84 compared to 0.82).  This might seem to be another reason for 
them to reconsider the minimised solution that has incorporated 1010. Not only, as we 
showed in the last section, does it lack “good” cases, but, in addition, it is more strongly 
quasi-sufficient for the negated than the non-negated outcome. The same point applies, 
more strongly in fact, to 1000 (with 0.85 for the negated outcome compared to 0.79 for 
the outcome). The authors appear to have privileged parsimony over such alternative 
considerations. However, it turns out that the paradoxical results that arise when 
consistencies are based on low scoring cases would themselves raise problems for any 
alternative approach which takes the consistencies for the remainder rows into account. 
We will now explain the relationship between low scoring cases and the appearance of 
paradoxical results. Figure 4 shows the scatter of cases for membership in the negated 
outcome (what the authors term low social inequality) by membership in the 
configuration 1010. In both this graph and that in Figure 3 for the outcome of high 
inequality, we have shaded the region where paradoxical results arise15.  
 
 
Figure 4: Negated outcome by 1010 (consistency is 0.84) 
 
For this configuration, 1010, which has, paradoxically, a consistency with the outcome 
of 0.82 and with the negated outcome of 0.84, it is easy to see that the reliance on low-
scoring cases has produced the paradoxical result that 1010 tends to quasi-sufficiency 
for both high and low inequality. Ignoring the 7 cases where the fuzzy score for the 
configuration is zero (which contribute nothing to the consistency score), we can see 
that, in each graph, 4 of the remaining 9 cases fall into the “paradoxical” region (and the 
others are near it), explaining, given the rather symmetrical distribution of the cases as a 
whole around the y=0.5 line, the two similar consistency scores. Clearly, if, instead of 
using the parsimony-seeking approach to determine which remainder rows enter a 
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solution, a researcher were to turn to the consistency figures associated with these rows, 
the danger of paradoxical results would immediately become a major problem to 
address. Both approaches, that of parsimony-seeking and that depending on consistency 
scores derived from only “non-good” cases, are problematic. The root cause is the same: 
the absence of “good” empirical cases for these rows. 
 
Some reanalyses 
We now explore what difference it makes to the authors’ conclusions if we take some of 
our concerns into account in carrying out a reanalysis of their truth table. There are 
several things we could do, apart from the most conservative decision of accepting the 
complex solution (4) in Table 7 and the corresponding complex solution for the negated 
outcome. First, in place of the mechanical parsimonious approach we might use Ragin’s 
(2008) more theoretical approach to counterfactuals to allow some remainders to be 
incorporated as “easy” counterfactuals into the minimised solution. In doing this, we 
might or might not take account of the consistency figures that appear in Table 3 for 
these remainder rows16. In doing this, we would be creating an “intermediate” solution 
falling somewhere between the bounds set by the complex and parsimonious solutions 
in Table 7. Second, we could use the additional alternative measure for consistency that 
has appeared in recent revisions of the fsQCA software (the PRI measure). This 
measure is designed to remove the contribution of cases that fall into the paradoxical 
region, but its properties are not yet, to our knowledge, well understood. Third, we 
could run some analyses that only employ data for good cases, i.e. those with 
membership over 0.5 in each row. These possibilities serve to remind us how much 
judgement needs to be used in order to produce valid analyses when fuzzy sets are 
employed17. 
 
Given the limitations of space, we’ll take, as our illustration, the third possibility, 
looking at what happens if we use just the “good” cases to calculate the consistencies 
that determine, once a threshold is set, which rows go forward into any minimised 
solution18. We will show that this also, like Ragin’s recent PRI measure, addresses, to 
some extent, the problem of paradoxical consistencies arising for the outcome and its 
negation. However, given Ragin’s own recent arguments for preferring intermediate 
solutions19 (Mendel & Ragin 2011), we will also, within the context of our using just 
“good” cases, say a little about the use of counterfactual reasoning and parsimony.  
 
Taking, first, this “good” cases route, and using expression (3) to calculate 
consistencies, produces the revised truth table for sufficiency shown in Table 8 (where, 
of course, some rows have no “good” cases and, hence, now, no consistencies). 
 
We can see, by examining the pairs of consistency figures for the outcome and its 
negation, that the paradoxical results that characterised Table 3 have mainly 
disappeared. For example, while in Table 3 we had, for 0111, the two values 0.79 and 
0.78, we now have 0.38 and 0.99. This configuration is now clearly sufficient for the 
negated outcome and clearly not so for the outcome. The one configuration where the 
two values remain close is 0001. This reduction of paradoxical results is a major benefit 
of using just “good” cases to set against the disadvantage of losing some of the evidence 
relevant to subset relationships that might be derived by from cases with low 
memberships in rows without “good” cases. 
 
We can proceed to minimise this truth table, starting with the complex solution for the 
outcome, high social inequality in education. Taking account of jumps in the 
consistencies, two obvious thresholds present themselves, 1.0 and 0.75. To keep our 
argument simpler we will just concentrate on the expressions that appear in the 
solutions for quasi-sufficiency, which we wish to compare with those derived by Freitag 
and Schlicht, and will ignore the details of coverage. We obtain the minimised solutions 
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shown in Table 9 under “complex solutions”. We have used the lower threshold of 0.75 
partly, as we said, in recognition of a jump in the consistency figures, but also in order 
to note that this solution reproduces the author’s own complex solution with a threshold 
of 0.85 (see their footnote 17).  It is not, of course, the same as their favoured 
parsimonious solution (see Table 1 here) which was CHILD + FULL*select*TRACK. 
A plot of our 0.75 complex “good” cases solution is shown in Figure 520. If we were to 
plot our 1.0 complex solution, CHILD*FULL*SELECT+ CHILD*full*select*TRACK, 
we would lose the two cases, HH and SL, below the y=x line.  
 
Table 8: Truth table with consistencies based only on “good” cases 




1 1 1 1 BY, BW 1.00 0.10 
1 0 0 1 NW 1.00 0.26 
1 1 1 0 RP 1.00 0.22 
0 1 0 1 HH 0.82 0.44 
1 1 0 1 SL 0.79 0.46 
0 0 0 1 TH, SN, MV, ST  0.66 0.56 
0 1 0 0 HB 0.43 1.00 
0 1 1 1 SH 0.38 0.99 
0 1 1 0 NI 0.13 1.00 
0 0 0 0 BE, BB, HE 0.12 1.00 
0 0 1 0 none none none 
0 0 1 1 none none none 
1 0 0 0 none none none 
1 0 1 0 none none none 
1 0 1 1 none none none 
1 1 0 0 none none none 
 
Given that, including just “good” cases, a minimised solution using the authors’ 
threshold of 0.85 would generate the solution CHILD*FULL*SELECT+ 
CHILD*full*select*TRACK and that our second “good” cases analysis, employing 
0.75, has generated the authors’ complex rather than their favoured parsimonious 
solution, we would argue that their conclusions need reconsideration. However, our 
main point has not been to question the particular conclusions of Freitag and Schlicht 
but rather to explore the working assumptions, some of which seem to be open to 
question, that underlie them in order to increase users’ understanding of the 
complexities of fuzzy logical analysis.  
 
Table 9: Sufficiency (for outcome of high inequality) using just “good” cases 
 Complex solutions Intermediate solutions Parsimonious solutions 
Threshold set at 1.0 (but 
same as 0.85 level, in fact) 
CHILD*FULL*SELECT+  
CHILD*full*select*TRACK  
CHILD*full*TRACK   +  
CHILD*FULL*SELECT    
CHILD*full     + 
CHILD*SELECT   
Threshold set at 0.75 CHILD*select*TRACK+  
FULL*select*TRACK+  
CHILD*FULL*SELECT 
CHILD*TRACK     +  
FULL*select*TRACK    +  






Figure 5: The outcome by the solution CHILD*select*TRACK + 
FULL*select*TRACK+ CHILD*FULL*SELECT 
 
We can push this concern further by showing how, in the face of limited diversity, 
different treatment of the six “remainder” rows generates the three different solutions of 
a truth table that fsQCA allows. The complex solution allows no remainders to be 
included in the minimisation22. The parsimonious solution, as explained earlier, allows 
remainders to be allocated atheoretically, simply in the interests of the simplest possible 
solution23. The intermediate solution is derived by taking account of theoretically 
derived assumptions entered by the analyst concerning the expected direction of the 
effects of some or all factors24. The latter requires us to understand what Ragin means 
by counterfactual reasoning. In Table 8 we can see that the configuration 1001 is 
sufficient for the outcome. There are two “remainder” configurations, 1101 and 1011, 
which differ from this on one condition but for which we have no “good” cases. In each 
of these one 0 is changed, in comparison with 1001, to a 1, introducing the presence of a 
factor assumed by Freitag and Schlicht, theoretically, to contribute to the outcome. The 
researcher might argue that if 1001 is sufficient for high inequality then it is reasonable 
to assume that, were cases of 1101 and 1011 to exist, then we would find these 
configurations also to be sufficient. Therefore s/he could choose to allow these two 
remainder rows to go forward into the solution. The “intermediate” solutions in Table 9 
have been generated by entering four such assumptions, i.e. that adding the presence in 
such pair-wise comparisons of any of CHILD, FULL, TRACK and SELECT will tend 
to increase inequality. On the other hand, as explained earlier, the “parsimonious” 
solutions have been produced by allowing the software to allocate the outcome or its 
absence to these logical remainder rows in whatever way produces the most 
parsimonious solution. We would just note that the intermediate solutions generate yet 
another argument for the use of judgement. They differ both from our “complex” 
solution based on “good” cases as well as from the solutions favoured by Freitag and 
Schlicht.   
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What about the negated outcome (termed by the authors “low inequality”)? Our revised 
results, based on just “good” cases, are shown in Table 10. Here, again, we have 
generated three minimised solutions by treating remainders differently. In producing the 
intermediate solution, we have assumed that the absence of each of CHILD, FULL, 
TRACK and SELECT will tend to reduce inequality. In the case of the parsimonious 
solution, a further complication arises, given that there are two possible minimisations 
of the truth table (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Sufficiency (for outcome of low inequality) using just “good” cases 
 Complex solution Intermediate solution Parsimonious solution 
Threshold set at 
0.99 
 child*select*track   + 
child*FULL*SELECT       
 
child*track     + 
child*SELECT       
 
child*SELECT +  
  





The parsimonious solution given by the authors is simply child*track25. None of our 
three “good” case solutions matches this. Once again, we are faced with making choices 
between solutions based on different working assumptions. It is not clear why we 
should prefer the parsimonious solution chosen by Freitag and Schlicht. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Freitag and Schlicht present their conclusions in a fairly confident manner; for example: 
Altogether, we have provided a scientific foundation to the lively debate about the causes of 
highly differential degrees of social inequality in education among political units. Our results 
mainly indicate the relevance of early childhood education for the existence of social 
inequality in education. As we hypothesized, availability of early childhood education seems 
to be able to mitigate different preconditions of starting school. An absence of both, widely 
available early child care and high preschool enrollment rates, is sufficient for a high degree 
of social inequality in education. (p. 66) 
 
Our discussion suggests that they should be more circumspect. 
 
What are the main lessons of our discussion? There are several to stress. Clearly, 
in general, all analytic techniques need to be used in conjunction with judgement 
and an understanding of the main likely threats to valid analysis likely to arise in 
their use. It is especially important to report these threats explicitly when, as with 
fsQCA, mathematics such as fuzzy sets and logic, whose properties are new to 
most social scientists, are embedded in easily available and easy-to-use software. 
More particularly, when using fsQCA in the context of limited diversity, there are 
potential counterfactual decisions over logical remainders to be made which will 
be, and will remain, contestable. Ragin (e.g. 2008) has argued the need for care in 
this area. Any researcher not wishing to report only the complex solution of his or 
her truth table will need to turn to counterfactual reasoning about logical 
remainders. Such reasoning will only be as good as extant theory26. 
 
Having noted the difficulties that will arise in using contestable counterfactual 
reasoning, we would still, in general, want to argue against the mechanical 
approach employed in producing the parsimonious solutions favoured in Freitag 
and Schlicht’s paper. We can understand why Ragin has expressed a preference 
for intermediate solutions in his recent dialogue with Mendel (Mendel & Ragin 
2011), especially given the frequency with which QCA has been used with small 
datasets that give rise to limited diversity. Our own current view is that, except 
where a very strong body of existing theory can provide a sound basis for the 
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counterfactual reasoning that allows some logical remainders into solutions, it 
might be safer to privilege complex solutions.  
 
Against this position, it can be pointed out that complex solutions effectively 
assume that any remainder rows do not obtain the outcome, i.e. that, in terms of 
Boolean logic, they are “false” (e.g. Ragin 2000, p. 106). This certainly means 
that the complex solution might not contain all the configurations that are really 
sufficient for the outcome (and this would then prevent some simplification of the 
solution). However, whether, in any particular analysis, this implicit assumption 
of “falsity” for the remainders is accepted by default or not, those configurations 
reported as sufficient for the outcome in the complex solution remain so, since 
they would still appear as a subset of any more general solution that incorporated 
some remainder rows as “true”. What is lost, if the default assumption concerning 
remainders is false, is the chance to declare that, for example, A*B is sufficient 
for the outcome rather than A*B*c (or, alternatively, A*B*C). Now, whether this 
matters seems to us to depend on whether it is thought that A*B*c and A*B*C are 
causally equivalent or not (i.e. whether A*B does or does not collapse two 
combinations sufficient for the outcome that actually are different at the level of 
mechanisms and processes). This points to a general issue re minimisation that 
deserves more discussion. 
 
More mundanely, on the basis of what we have explored in this paper, we would 
recommend that researchers always look carefully at fuzzy scatterplots of 
outcomes and negated outcomes by membership in the configurations that 
comprise the truth table (see our Figures 3 and 4). This should focus attention on 
the proportion of their cases that fall into the paradox-generating region. The 
effects of a large proportion of cases falling here should also be visible in the truth 
table columns for consistency for the outcome and its negation, as they were here 
in Table 3. We would also recommend that researchers consider running parallel 
“good” case analyses, as we have, since these can act as a useful check on the 




                                                                 
1
 It has been used for micro-sociological purposes in this field. See Cooper (2005a,b), Cooper & Glaesser 
(2008a,b, 2010, 2011), Cooper & Harries (2009), Glaesser (2008), Glaesser & Cooper (2010), Ragin (2006a). 
2
 They also employ some other measures as controls in further analyses, but little detail is given, and we will 
not discuss these here. 
3
 We quote: “The odds ratios represent the varying chances of being enrolled at the Gymnasium, as opposed to 
one of the other school types, for the highest and second-lowest (reference quartile in PISA-E, working class) 
ESCS quartiles” (Freitag and Schlicht, 2009, p. 51). 
4
 For an example of this approach in use, see Cooper & Glaesser (2010) and, for a discussion of some of its 
disadvantages, chapter 5 of Cooper, Glaesser, Hammersley and Gomm (in press). 
5
 The parallel expression for coverage replaces |X| with |Y|. 
6
 This expression gives the conventional result for two crisp sets since, there, the two summations 
reduce to counting the members of the sets. The parallel expression for fuzzy coverage replaces, in 
the denominator, the sum of the memberships in x with those in y. 
7
 A case will always have membership of 0.5 or larger in at least one configuration. A case will never appear in 
more than one configuration with a membership larger than 0.5. There are circumstances, however, where a 
case will not appear in any configuration with a membership over 0.5. This arises when the case has a 
membership in at least one of the condition sets of exactly 0.5. For example, with four conditions, as we have 
here, if a case were to have membership in the sets of 0.5, 0.3, 0.6 and 0.7, then its highest membership in any 
configuration would be 0.5 (which it would have in two of the 16 configurations). 
8
 It is always possible to calculate consistencies for rows with no “good” cases, just as long as there are some 
cases with non-zero membership in these rows. 
9
 We should note that Ragin, having reflected over a long period on this choice, is well aware of its pros and 
cons in comparison with the alternatives (as will become clearer later). 
10
 There are, incidentally, nine Länder which are “good” cases of high inequality, i.e. which have a membership 
of over 0.5 in this fuzzy outcome set (Table 2). 
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11
 For an account of raw and unique coverage, see Ragin (2006b). 
12
 See footnote 17 of Freitag and Schlicht (2009). 
13
 In Ragin (2005, p. 8) he made a similar point: 
“The distribution of cases across causal combinations is easy to assess when causal conditions are represented 
with crisp sets, for it is a simple matter to construct a truth table from such data and to examine the number of 
cases crisply sorted into each row. When causal conditions are fuzzy sets, however, this analysis is less 
straightforward because each case may have partial membership in every truth table row … Still, it is important 
to assess the distribution of cases’ membership scores across causal combinations in fuzzy -set analyses because 
some combinations may be empirically trivial. In other words, if most cases have very low or zero membership 
in a combination, then it is pointless to assess that combination’s link to the outcome. The empirical base for 
such an assessment would be too weak.” 
14
 We should note that explanatory coverage will differ in the two cases (Ragin 2006b). 
15
 Since Y + NOT-Y =1, either both Y and NOT-Y are 0.5, or only one of Y and NOT-Y will be above 0.5.  It 
follows from this that the particular paradox we are describing can only arise when X is less than or equal to 
0.5. However, not all cases with X =< 0.5 will generate a paradox. Consider the conventional x,y plane. Using 
the simple fuzzy inclusion rule, we need to have x=< y, for x to be sufficient for y. For x to also be sufficient 
for not-y, we need x=< (1-y), i.e. y=< 1-x. The region of the plane where these two constraints are met 
simultaneously is the shaded region plus the boundaries set by y=x and y=1-x. Cases on the line x=0 itself are 
omitted from calculations of sufficiency in the fsQCA software. 
16
 If we were to take account of the consistencies for remainder rows, we would, given what we have shown 
above, be allowing consistencies arising from the paradoxical region of the fuzzy plots in  Figures 3 and 4 (and 
others like these) to play a role in our decisions. On the other hand, if we didn’t use these consistencies, we 
would be open to a charge of ignoring relevant evidence. This paradox-related dilemma is inherent in fuzzy set 
QCA. 
17
 Considerable judgement is also required, of course, in using conventional methods. 
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 This is something Ragin himself has reflected on, writing in response to a question re this approach: 
 
I have thought about this alternate measure of consistency, but not used it for several reasons.  The 
first is that they really are two separate questions: (1) Do I have any real instances of a configuration? 
(frequency threshold) and (2) Is the evidence consistent with a subset relation (calculation of 
consistency).  On the first question, let's say you have 100 cases and they all have .2 membership in 
the configuration. These membership scores sum to 20, a substantial number, but you really don't 
have any instances of the configuration.  This justifies the greater than .5 rule.  Now the second 
question.  The issue of subsethood really is one about ceilings.  The value of Y is a ceiling for the 
value of X.  (IF X exceeds Y by a good margin, then it is evidence against subsethood.)  Thus, if X= 
.4 and Y= .7, this constitutes good evidence in favour of subsethood, even though X is less than .5. 
(Personal communication to Cooper, 21
st
 June 2004). 
 
We should stress that we do not see the alternative approach (i.e. using just good cases) as a panacea for the 
problems we discussed earlier. Our current view is that it is worth using this in conjunction with the approach 
embedded in the fsQCA software.  
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 Here, Ragin writes in response to Mendel’s questions: The point is simply that the parsimonious solution can 
often be over inclusive with respect to remainders. In fact, it usually is, which is why I almost always favour 
the intermediate solutions (p. 13). … … The basic idea I've been working with is that parsimonious solutions, 
in general, cannot be trusted because they incorporate difficult counterfactuals and must therefore be 
“corrected” via the intermediate solution routine (p. 16.) …  … keep in mind that the complex solutions 
sometimes include what I consider nuisance terms, especially when the diversity of cases is low and the 
number of causal conditions is great. For example, suppose the outcome is staying out of poverty and o ne of 
the conditions included in a successful combination is having “low income parents.” If the reason that that this 
condition is included is simply because there was no matched row with “not -low income parents” (i.e., there 
were no cases with this specific combination), then having “low income parents” as part of a combination 
linked to staying out of poverty is truly a nuisance. This is why I almost universally prefer intermediate 
solutions (p. 35). 
20
 The aggregating nature of the consistency measure used in the truth table algorithm of fsQCA allows a 
solution generated using a threshold lower than 1.0 to include, as can be seen here, some “near miss” cases that 
fall out of the upper triangular area that contains cases satisfying the rule for strict fuzzy sufficiency (i.e. 
satisfying x=<y). For a rationale for this, see Ragin (2008, pp. 45-54). 
21
 This table appears to agree with the authors’ claim that “child” (i.e. ~CHILD) is necessary for a low degree 
of inequality, though it should be noted that this conclusion is one based only on the empirically available 
rows. We can note that, if ~CHILD is quasi-necessary for ~OUTCOME, then CHILD should be quasi-
sufficient for OUTCOME. To test the latter claim we need data on all the rows where CHILD=1, but we in fact 
lack data for four of eight of these. 
22
 Remainders are all set to false; no counterfactuals (Ragin et al. 2008). 
23
 Any remainder that will help generate a logically simpler solution is used, regardless of whether it constitutes 
an “easy” or a “difficult” counterfactual case (Ragin et al. 2008). 
24
 Only remainders that are “easy” counterfactual cases are allowed to be incorporated into the solution. The 
designation of “easy” versus “difficult” is based on user-supplied information regarding the connection 
between each causal condition and the outcome (Ragin et al. 2008). 
20 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
25
If we generate an intermediate solution here, using all non-zero cases and a threshold of 0.9, and 
having said that negated conditions should be good for the outcome, we get the same result:  
child*track. 
26
 It is also the case that the reasoning used to justify “easy” counterfactuals might be argued to be somewhat 
non-configurational, since it appears it would be weakened by the existence of any complex interaction effects 
of which the analyst is ignorant.   
27
 The conclusions of a paper published by one of us (Cooper 2005a) which was one of the first to use 
fsQCA to analyse a large dataset, also need to be read with the lessons of this current paper in mind. 
There was no problem of limited diversity to address, given the size etc. of the dataset. However, the 
points raised here about the paradoxical region of the x,y plot are relevant. Since that paper was 
published Ragin has modified the consistency measure in the truth table algorithm. We have run a 
reanalysis using this new measure, for the outcome, highest level of qualifications achieved, by class, 
sex and ability. The consistency figures for the outcome are higher with the new measure but the 
ordering of the rows of the 8-row truth table is identical. The new solution that allows the three rows 
with the highest consistencies forward (using a threshold of 0.8) reproduces a solution from Cooper 
(2005a), as does the new four row solution (using a 0.75 threshold). When we look at the solutions for 
the negated outcome, using these two thresholds, we find just one paradoxical row, this being the row 
that is in the 0.75 but not the 0.8 solution. This suggests to us that the 3-row solution is more valid. This 
is borne out by an separate analysis using Ragin’s new PRI measure (to remove cases in the inconsistent 
region of the x,y plot). We find this measure produces lower consistencies. Taking this into account in 
setting thresholds, we obtain two solutions with no paradoxical rows, one of which is the 3-row solution 
reported in Cooper (2005a), the other a 2-row solution also reported in that paper. Furthermore, an 
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